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THE U.S. NAVY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM:
APPLYING THE LESSONS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS

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
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Executive Summary

Title: The US Navy and the Global War on Terrorism: Applying the Lessons of the War on Drugs

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Thesis: The US Navy must apply the lessons of the War on Drugs and lead a global, multilateral, joint, interagency maritime campaign that achieves Maritime Domain Awareness, provides operational command and control, and shores up the maritime borders of weak coastal states.

Discussion: Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the US Navy, along with the rest of the interagency, has looked to transform in order to better meet the challenges of the Global War on Terrorism. Perhaps more than the other services, this mandate to improve its contribution to the GWOT is complicated by the obvious need to remain the preeminent blue-water navy in the world. The Navy, however, can do both. A review of nearly forty years of experience in counter another transnational threat, illicit drug trafficking, reveals lessons applicable to the Navy's role in the Global War on Terrorism. The Navy, in partnership with the interagency, was very effective at interdicting maritime drug trafficking in the transit zone between South and Central American source-countries. Effective interdiction required, however, more than what the Navy could provide for detection and monitoring. It required multinational partners, building capability and capacity in some partner nations, prolific information sharing, fused all-source intelligence, and an interagency, multinational mechanism to achieve synergy at the operational level. Although not without challenges, implementing these lessons will be far less challenging than some may think. With a shift in mindset, improvement in education, and a small manpower realignment, the Navy could stand ready today.

Conclusion: The Navy should build a maritime network to fight the terrorist network. In addition to the 1,000 ship navy concept, the Navy should implement a 1,000-cutter concept to shore up weak littoral borders of coastal partner nations. Addition of Title 10 responsibilities to Title 22 responsibilities of the Navy Sections of country teams in priority countries will provide the connection between Navy Component Commanders and partner nation littoral forces and information. To synergize interagency and partner efforts, the Navy should establish command elements, subordinate to the numbered fleet commanders, similar to Joint Interagency Task Force South, to focus on Maritime Security Operations (MSO). Only when the Navy becomes a leader of the interagency effort needed to detect, monitor, and deny terrorist use of the seas will it have reached its potential in contributing to the Global War on Terrorism.

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Preface

This paper is the result of more than straight research. I chose the topic based on experiences in counter-narcotics operations in South America at the end of the 1990s through 2002, deployments to East Africa, and a tour as the Special Operations Advisor on the staff of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. The research I have completed in some cases filled in the blanks and reinforced suspicions developed from experience, while some of the research overturned those suspicions. Most importantly, when you are done reading this essay, I hope you will see the importance of instituting a different culture in the US Navy. The Navy must be as comfortable with operations to influence human beings as it is with pitting the best technology in the world against inferior technology. I am, of course, not voting to sacrifice the latter for the former, but I believe that we can do both. While we should always adapt technology to deal with evolving problems, it is mental agility achieved through education and human relationships that will make the US Navy a successful contributor to the Global War on Terrorism.

I owe a great many thanks as so many have contributed sage thoughts to this work. I would like to thank my mentor in this process, Dr. Paul D. Gelpi, who provided just the right mix of patience and encouragement. I would be remiss if I did not mention my seminar faculty advisors, Dr. Richard L. Dinardo and Lieutenant Colonel Roger Morin who have expanded my mind during my stay at Marine Corps University. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I want to extend thanks to all of the senior enlisted personnel with whom I have had the honor to serve, and upon whose shoulders I have at times appeared a giant. They have taught me the most important lessons.

INTRODUCTION

The attacks of 11 September 2001 shook the National Security community, and gave cause for transformation. As Operation ENDURING FREEDOM continued in Afghanistan, and talks began concerning Iraq, the DOD began to ask itself if it was organized, manned, trained, and equipped for the Global War on Terrorism. Admiral Vern Clark, then Chief of Naval Operations, published a Transformation Roadmap in 2003 that reflected the platform and technology-centric culture of the Navy.¹ The current Secretary of the Navy, in a speech to the Heritage Foundation leaned equally heavily toward preparing the Navy for major combat operations though he recognized the Navy would continue to see more littoral and brown-water operations.² This line of thinking, however, does not address the human, transnational, networked nature of the GWOT enemy. The threat of terrorism is often referred to as a new threat, but at the time of this writing it has been six-and-a-half years since Al Qaida destroyed the twin towers and severely damaged the Pentagon. The War on Terrorism is also not the first time the US Navy has been called to play a leading role in countering a transnational threat. A review of the War on Drugs shows that the Navy, in cooperation with interagency and multinational partners can significantly disrupt transnational actor use of the maritime domain. The US Navy must apply the lessons of the War on Drugs and lead a global, multilateral, joint, interagency maritime campaign that achieves Maritime Domain Awareness, provides operational command and control, and shores up the maritime borders of weak coastal states.

This paper will initially discuss the importance of countering terrorists throughout the maritime domain. Then it will review the War on Drugs as a case study in countering transnational threats, and extract lessons, both positive and negative, applicable to the US Navy's contribution to the Global War on Terrorism. After analysis of the United States' experience in

the War on Drugs the paper will offer discussion of the US Navy's current initiatives and thinking, and close with recommendations for improvement of the US Navy's contribution to the GWOT.

THE MARITIME DOMAIN AND THE TASK AT HAND

The maritime environment is defined by the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness as, "all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances."³ This accounts for nearly three-quarters of the earth's surface and is the thoroughfare upon which over 90 percent of the world's commerce flows. Today, the vast majority of the world's population lives within 200 kilometers of the oceans. Colonial powers recognized the importance of this, which prompted the naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, along with the naval historian and US President Theodore Roosevelt, to recognize that to be a global power a nation must be a naval power. The United States has never looked back.⁴

The maritime domain is important to terrorist organizations for the same reasons. Terrorists make use of the oceans and waterways to move people, resources, and money with the added advantage of relative anonymity. Outside the twelve nautical mile limits of internationally recognized territorial waters the ocean is a global common for which no one entity has responsibility. Inside territorial waters, the state has exclusive rights. The global common is too vast to police in its entirety, while territorial waters are often not policed because of either unwilling or incapable nations.

There continue to be concerns of maritime terrorism, but these scenarios are considered low risk, are usually conducted from land, and are mostly prevented through good force protection

actions. For the terrorists, attacks at sea have little chance of attracting maximum public attention, achieving significant loss of life, and are significantly complicated by reasonably good security measures, thus hold little value.⁵

The challenge for the US Navy and all US naval forces is to detect, monitor, and interdict or facilitate the interdiction of terrorists, or prevent terrorism related use of the vast maritime domain. The nature of terrorist organizations makes this difficult. According to the National Military Strategic Plan for the Global War on Terrorism, "the enemy is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals—and their state and non-state supporters."⁶

As with the GWOT, the War on Drugs presented a transnational, organized, enemy who sought support from both state and non-state sponsors, and whose activities undermined the state system. As Dr. Max Manwaring states in his monograph entitled *US Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Why Colombia, Why Now, and What is to be Done?*, "Colombian narco-traffickers have bribed, intimidated, kidnapped, and assassinated government leaders, judges, law enforcement and military officials, journalists, citizens, and even soccer players." Clearly the damage to the drug users and their family and friends, and the associated cost to the citizens of the United States in terms of justice programs and medical care are indisputable. But, perhaps the destabilizing effect to the region and the world are even more important. Mr. Manwaring goes on, "The FARC has created major political-psychological-economic-social-moral conflicts and presents a clear and present threat to the existence of the state as we know it. And, the spillover effects of the illegal drug industry have inspired violence, corruption, and instability throughout Latin America in general and Caribbean transit countries in particular."⁷ The War on Drugs also presented no definable "victory" in the classic sense, but rather a possible steady state

that would be defined and constantly redefined by the day-to-day tolerance expressed by the state citizenry through pressure on the political system.⁸

The War on Drugs is an important case study for more than its similarity. The War on Drugs is inextricably connected to the GWOT today. Perhaps the best recognition of this can be found in the National Maritime Security Strategy:

Maritime drug trafficking generates vast amounts of money for international organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations. Laundered through the international financial systems, this money provides a huge source of virtually untraceable funds. These monetary assets can then be used to bribe government officials, bypass established financial controls, and fund additional illegal activities, including arms trafficking, migrant smuggling, and terrorist operations. Further, these activities can ensure a steady supply of weapons and cash for terrorist operatives, as well as the means for their clandestine movement.⁹

Another vital connection, which is especially relevant to US Navy GWOT planners, is that transnational threats ride on the same clandestine logistics backbone. There are a number of examples of these connections, but the most tangible is the connection between the Afghanistan and Pakistan opium markets and Taliban and al-Qaida fighters.

THE WAR ON DRUGS: COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

President Richard Nixon declared a "War on Drugs" identifying drug abuse as public enemy #1 in 1971. The Department of Defense (DOD) has been involved ever since.¹⁰ From 1971 to 1981 DOD's assistance was inconsistent and without coordination. The US Navy would pass information on sightings of drug smuggling ships to the US Coast Guard (USCG), but limited its operations to only providing information, at least partially due to the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385). This operational model was nearly useless, leading to only three seizures in the first year.¹¹

In 1981 Public Law 97-86, the Defense Authorization Act for 1982, authorized DOD to provide direct support to interdiction agencies. Still, operations lacked unity of effort. Initially, the Coast Guard made limited use of Navy assets due to restrictions the Navy placed on their ships, essentially only allowing for serendipitous support. To help coordinate interagency efforts, President Reagan established the South Florida Task force, which grew to the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) and was designated the lead for federal coordination of anti-drug activities.¹²

To give more teeth to Navy-Coast Guard coordination Congress authorized \$15M for the Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Team (TACLET) program in 1986, which would train Coast Guard detachments to ride Navy ships and bring their law enforcement capabilities and authorities to the Navy's capacity. Progress was slow in the beginning, but in 1987 Coast Guard TACLETs, operating from Navy ships, seized five smuggling vessels. Greater progress was clearly hampered by the fact that operations were still largely uncoordinated and lacked fused intelligence. The Coast Guard's boarding rate of success was poor, but when units had intelligence indicating the target of interest (TOI) was carrying drugs, success tripled.¹³

To expand and improve cooperation, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was created in 1988 by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (Public Law 100-690), which also disestablished NNBIS. The intent was to provide unifying policy to thirty-some agencies now involved in the War on Drugs. The Director, however, had no directive authority over the agencies; he was left to coordinate only. In September that same year the Defense Authorization act for 1989 gave DOD the lead for "Detection and Monitoring" (D&M) of smuggling aircraft and maritime vessels heading for the United States, as well as establishing a DOD-Law

Enforcement Agency C4I network. Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) would still conduct interdictions, but DOD now had a mandate to become a major player.¹⁴

The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) gave the lead for the new D&M mission to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCLANT). CINCLANT responded establishing three Joint Task Forces (JTFs), JTF-4 in Key West, Florida and JTF-5 in Alameda, California for maritime transit zone operations, and JTF-6 in El Paso, Texas for land operations. Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) would continue to focus on training source-country LEAs.¹⁵

To assuage concerns that the ten thousand pound gorilla would exclude the interagency, LANTCOM began holding quarterly conferences to coordinate interagency requests for support. These conferences served as the core of the planning process early on. The Joint Staff followed suit, as any requirement to move forces across combatant commander lines, such as deploying forces to SOUTHCOM, would require SECDEF approval. The results of the quarterly planning conferences went to the services for sourcing, and to JTF-4's bimonthly concept of operations meeting. The focus on coordination seemed to have the desired effect, and early operations provided reason for hope.¹⁶

Early operations provided reason for hope. Within the first year of the establishment of JTF-4, shipments fell off by over 30 percent and success was reduced from 80 to 10 percent. Interdiction efforts pushed traffickers to predicted routes and seemed to substantially disrupt the traffickers overall operations. By 1994 interagency efforts had largely disrupted the air bridge, and the majority of shipments shifted to maritime routes (89 percent of which were in the Caribbean). Significant increases in jettisoned cargo and delays were increasing business cost and risk for the traffickers.¹⁷

1993 saw the rollout of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Presidential Decision Directive 14 (PDD 14). The first changed the acronym for USLANTCOM to USACOM, but more importantly gave it combatant command authority over its service component commands, making it the prime force provider. The latter reflected a shift in counter-drug policy. PDD 14 focused DOD operations on defeating the cartels, supporting source country LEAs, building interdiction capabilities in source countries, and directed increase in intelligence-cued over patrol-based interdiction.¹⁸

DOD's role expanded as it realized that it could provide a number of related capabilities such as intelligence, logistics and training support, and research and development. As JTF-4 began to deal with all of these other responsibilities as well as coordinating with the various agencies and coordinating support from other nations it saw the need to expand beyond a traditional JTF. Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-E) was established by presidential order and delineated in the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan NICCP in 1994 (NICCP also established JIATF-South (JIATF-S) in Panama, and renamed JTF-5 as JIATF-West (JIATF-W) and relocated it to Hawaii). Though it was to primarily "coordinate" it was also to "direct as necessary" D&M efforts.¹⁹

In June 1994 JIATF-E began improving multilateral cooperation when it coordinated a memorandum of understanding between the United States and the Royal Netherlands Navy. The Flag Officer Netherlands Force Caribbean (FONLFORCARIB), headquartered in Curacao, would wear a second hat as Task Group 4.4. JIATF-E brought the United Kingdom (UK) onboard a little later, and by 1997 the only Caribbean country with which an agreement was not solidified was Cuba.²⁰

As with all wars, the enemy's adjustments had something to do with the outcome. The traffickers responded to interagency success, and by 1996 shipments were getting smaller, there were more of them, and due to the US policy shift of PDD 14 and subsequent budget cuts, there were fewer assets with which to track the more distributed trafficking operations. The use of high-powered low-profile vessels, which were hard to identify and able to outrun anything the interagency had on the water at the time, set interdiction efforts back. Now, only the helicopters and the radio were able to capture the go-fasts.²¹

Despite innovations by the traffickers, such as go-fasts, transit zone interdiction results continued to improve throughout. For example, in 1994 US interagency efforts resulted in Coast Guard interdiction of just over 47,000 pounds of cocaine, and by 2006 the number was up to nearly 235,000 pounds.²² This certainly does not prove that maritime interdiction efforts won the drug war. Interdiction rates could have improved for a number of reasons, such as increase in traffic, sloppiness by traffickers, and improved interdiction mechanisms and techniques. With such consistent increase over time, however, it is reasonable to suggest that maritime interdiction operations were indeed a reason for improved annual seizure numbers.²³

One reason for continued interagency success was the establishment and maturation of Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs). As early as 1989 USACOM and USSOUTHCOM began forming TATs designed to fuse all-source intelligence from all of the participating agencies and countries. The TATs, formed primarily with US Special Forces and military intelligence personnel deployed to the American embassies in focus countries. The first TATs deployed to Peru and Bolivia, and by 1994 TATs were open for business in Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, Panama, Guatemala, and Honduras.²⁴

As operations continued, the TATs began to integrate more fully with other efforts in their assigned countries. Before long, TATs were centers of criminal investigations working with US training teams, US law enforcement agencies, and indirectly, with host nation law enforcement. They began to build more than just intelligence, they began to build case files with an eye toward arrest and conviction of key members of the trafficking organizations.²⁵ Perhaps most importantly, with regard to interdiction, the TATs fed their information into the JIATFs.

The supply-side effort in the War on Drugs was, of course, more than US maritime interdiction efforts. As mentioned above, USSOUTHCOM was heavily engaged throughout Central and South America focusing on training law enforcement agencies of the drug-producing Andean Ridge countries.²⁶ US training teams varied in size from as small as an individual advisor to around thirty advisors. These training teams deployed throughout the Andean Ridge. For example, in 1997, SOUTHCOM planned 37 missions spread between Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. SOUTHCOM also sponsored training of source-country military and law enforcement personnel at US facilities such as the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) and the School of the Americas. The training, both provided by the training teams and that provided by the US facilities covered basic to advanced tactical skills as well as, importantly, Human Rights training.²⁷

Responsibility for interdiction in the Caribbean was transferred to USSOUTHCOM in 1997, and in 1999, subsequent to SOUTHCOM's move from Panama to Florida, JIATF-S merged with JIATF-E and retained its moniker.²⁸ In that same year President Andres Pastrana of Colombia developed a comprehensive plan to improve governance and security, and defeat the insurgency in his beloved but beleaguered Colombia.

Plan Colombia is representative and the most significant example of a broader Andean Ridge Initiative that effectively brings all elements of national power to bear. In fact, progress in Colombia seen today was thought impossible ten years ago. Broadly, US support to Plan Colombia was designed to: support Human Rights and judicial reform, expand counter-narcotics operations into southern Colombia, provide alternative economic options to coca growers, assist the Colombian National Police (CNP), and increase interdiction of drugs.²⁹ Colombia, almost synonymous with drugs for many Americans, was already a centerpiece of US counter-narcotics policy and in 2000, at President Clinton's request, the US Congress approved six years of support (Public Law 106-246).³⁰

President Bush vowed to continue support after his arrival in the White House in 2001. The attacks of 9/11, and the election of an aggressive Colombian President, Alvaro Uribe, only reinforced his vigor, and in 2002, President Bush communicated his intent in the National Security Strategy: "In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorists and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state, and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups."³¹ In 2005, President Bush asked the Congress to continue support for Plan Colombia. The package the White House requested included operational support, specialized equipment, additional training for selected units, and FMF funding for Colombian Air Force and Navy interdiction programs.³² US support to Colombia's counter-narco-terrorism effort continues today.

Strong Points, Shortfalls, and Seams

The United States has been fighting the War on drugs for nearly 40 years now. There are a number of arguments for and against an eradication and interdiction (supply-side) approach and preference for a demand-side focused policy is not uncommon, but it is not the intent of this

monograph to settle that discussion. The relevant lessons for the GWOT are that interdiction efforts were effective at achieving interdiction goals, if not strategic objectives, and interagency mechanisms and processes combined with multilateral cooperation and security assistance can make great strides toward achieving Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Importantly, for the US Navy and its development of its role in the Global War on Terrorism, nearly 40 years of Maritime Security Operations in support of the War on Drugs is valuable experience.

The principle lesson of the War on Drugs is that countering networked, transnational threats requires a multilateral, interagency approach. A 2001 evaluation of Plan Colombia sums it up well when it says, "what is required, then, is a combined civil-military effort to apply the full human and physical resources of cooperating nations...In these terms, the attempt...cannot be strictly operational level, military police effort."³³ Perhaps the best manifestation of this lesson is the success of Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S).

JIATF-S and its predecessors have effectively promoted unity of effort and trust through true integration and codependency. JIATF-S is commanded by a Coast Guard Admiral and staffs all of its key leadership positions with a combination of interagency representation. The Admiral's vice comes from the Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP). If the operations officer is a Marine Colonel, then his deputy may be a DEA agent, and all of the agencies are represented in the Joint Intelligence Operations Center. In addition, JIATF-S has a full battery of liaison officers, not only from the interagency, but from all of the cooperating nations. Because they are on the same team, they take on a "one team, one fight" attitude.³⁴

The integrated nature of the organization recognizes that participating agencies are also codependent. While DOD focuses on the amount of drugs seized, the law enforcement community is primarily concerned about arrests. Without the aircraft provided by Customs and

Border Protection or the ships and cutters provided by DOD and the Coast Guard there would be no detection and monitoring operations, or maritime interdiction operations to facilitate arrests. Likewise, without the critical exploitation and resulting intelligence coming from arrests, there would be no intelligence to cue detection, monitoring, and interdiction. This codependency acts against the natural predilection toward protecting organizational rice-bowls.³⁵

The importance of intelligence, especially human intelligence seems to be a lesson learned over and over again. The principle role of the JIATF was to fuse all-source intelligence and use that intelligence to cue detection and monitoring resources as well as coordinate hand-off to law enforcement agencies and partner countries. JIATF-S is responsible for an area five times that of the United States, and has limited assets available. So, intelligence cued detection and monitoring is the only answer. The law enforcement community and the Tactical Analysis Teams are the principle sources of good intelligence, especially human intelligence, available to JIATF-S. The information warns of a likely or imminent narcotics shipment event and law enforcement agencies pass the information to analysts who fuse the information with other sources of intelligence and develop the picture further. The intelligence is then passed to operators who begin triage (since intelligence usually produces more targets than there are assets) and position assets.³⁶

Examples that highlight the importance of intelligence abound. In one particular instance, authorities passed British developed HUMINT indicating a narcotics-trafficking event was getting underway in the eastern Caribbean. JIATF-S assets located and tracked the target of interest (TOI) across the Atlantic. A French navy liaison located on the JIATF-S watch floor cued French forces who seized the vessel and off the coast of West Africa.³⁷

Another case involved a full-court press by Caribbean basin nations. Information provided to JIATF-S warned of a flight from Colombia to Central America. Colombian radar operators coordinated an intercept by the Colombian Air Force. The Colombian Air Force passed the tail number, and location to JIATF-S, which tracked the suspect with over-the-horizon radar. JIATF-S simultaneously coordinated another intercept by Belizean law enforcement aircraft and transport of DEA and Guatemalan law enforcement officers by US military helicopters to an arrest at the landing site.³⁸

For nations to cooperate, they sometimes need help. The Andean Ridge Initiative (ARI) and Plan Colombia security assistance in support of the War on Drugs is an example of this. Often partner nation limitations become limitations for the United States. Mobile Training Teams have been effective in bringing partner nation capability and capacity on step to meet the challenge. By half way through 2005 US-trained and supported Colombian security forces were well on their way to breaking 2004's record seizures of 178 metric tons of coca base and 196 metric tons of cocaine. With the maturation of source country operations, there were even indications that interdiction efforts were beginning to outpace trafficker operations. The price of cocaine was rocketing while street purity was plummeting.³⁹

The interagency effort in the War on Drugs has been far from perfect. Partner Caribbean nations still lack important capacity and capability, and the United States is unable to commit its own resources to assist all partner nations. One critical shortfall is in Maritime Patrol Aircraft, both fixed wing for detection and tracking, and helicopters for interdiction. MPA were listed as the chief limitation in one Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on cooperative operations between US and Colombian security forces in the transit zone. MPA are vital to locating specified vessels, described by other intelligence, while on the high seas.⁴⁰

As Army planners focus inland and Navy planners focus on the high seas a seam is created in territorial waters. Approximately one-third of the Navy MTTs focus on riverine and special warfare training while the rest address blue water training. The Coast Guard fills this gap somewhat with a number of international agreements concerning law enforcement, specifically associated with the drug trade, and has been active in building coastal forces by providing MTTs and equipment, like coastal patrol boats.⁴¹ Much of the resulting operational activity between the territorial water limits and the high-watermark, however, is uncoordinated. A Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff trip report stated, "there are no...organized and capable partner nation maritime source or transit zone programs."⁴²

There is one important exception. Operation FIREWALL was a very successful coordinated US-Colombia transit zone interdiction effort that synchronized US high-seas efforts with Colombian efforts in territorial waters. Operational results for Operation Firewall highlight the value of this type of program. Between 2004 and 2005 the operation netted approximately 80 metric tons of cocaine.⁴³

Though it was a slow learning process that developed over nearly 40 years, the US Navy, along with its interagency partners learned what it took to execute successful maritime security operations. In the early years the efforts were largely uncoordinated and marred by typical bureaucratic infighting. As the 80's ended and the 90's began a new era was ushered in as DOD was given the "detection and monitoring" mantle. The birth of the JIATF concept brought with it the beginnings of significant operational success. Today, the interagency operates successfully from source-region to transit zone. It will be important for the Navy to take these lessons forward to the War on Terrorism as it develops its contribution to national defense in this new, uncertain era.

THE US NAVY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

The Pentagon continues to balance the need to remain the worlds preeminent conventional force while transforming to meet emerging irregular threats. Some argue for the continued organization and training for the significant state military threats such as China, Iran, and North Korea. Others argue that there should be a complete shift to organizing and training for irregular threats, though it is unclear what 'they' mean by 'irregular threats.' There is an emerging school that argues the United States must organize and train to meet the threat of 'hybrid warfare'; that is, a hybrid of regular and irregular threats.⁴⁴

The US Navy's GWOT realignment efforts so far reflects a line of thinking that ignores the nature of the human, transnational, networked enemy. The initiatives listed in appendixes A and B are laudable, but do little in terms of building a network to fight a network. They rightfully focus on force protection and support to other Services and Special Operations Forces, but the US Navy has a significant role of its own to command.⁴⁵

"The US Navy has always had to deal with a changing national security environment. But the events of September 11 have made that environment much more fluid. It is clear that the Navy must address a range of issues in this new security environment that will require decisions. The Navy's role is expanding beyond its traditional sea and Marine role into that of homeland defense."⁴⁶ A RAND study charged with evaluating "forks in the road" for the Navy in terms of personnel and acquisition policy and operational vision listed a number of "forks" identified by interviewees. None of the forks identified by the litany of Navy, active and retired, and research professionals reflects a thinking that understands the human nature of the war on terrorism. It reflects a thinking that is predictably platform and technology centric.⁴⁷

It is no surprise that the US Navy struggles with realigning for the GWOT, and was indeed slower than the other Services to begin. In some ways the Navy's challenge of realigning to the GWOT is greater than the other services, primarily because it has such a significant day-to-day role in supporting theaters of war like Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as conducting irregular warfare operations throughout the maritime environment. On any given day, fleet commanders manage strategic presence, conventional bilateral exercises, tactical air and airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) flights for major theaters of war, Maritime Security Operations (MSO) such as Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) and counter-piracy operations, and stand ready to provide emergency Humanitarian Assistance or Disaster Relief. GWOT transformation efforts have to be balanced with transformations for non-GWOT challenges such as China's rising fleet.

The review of the War on Drugs suggests that the US Navy does not have to abandon current initiatives, nor significantly realign its acquisitions or personnel programs. The US Navy's tasks in support of the GWOT are not significantly different than those in support of the War on Drugs. The scope is broader, without question, but the tasks are of the same nature. The US Navy can focus on existing areas with a minor shift in mindset and education to reach its full potential in support of the GWOT.

Some might counter that the development of Visit Board Search and Seizure teams, Maritime Interception Intelligence Exploitation Teams and Riverine Squadrons reflect a departure from ship-and-aircraft-centric culture, but these are mere tactical components. At the operational level the same people might claim that the Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center and the Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives show the US Navy's evolution as an Irregular Warfare force. These are all important steps, to be sure, but the irregular character of the Long

War will require more action to shape the human terrain upon which the terrorists exist and thrive.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Navy should continue to improve its Maritime Domain Awareness program, include a security assistance initiative to build coastal security force capacity inside priority countries, and establish operational-level command and control mechanisms in the Navy Component Commands to bring the network to fight a network together.

Equip for China, educate to fight terrorism. Greater flexibility in the ability of the US Naval Forces to counter, and prevent both regular and irregular threats provides the greater solution. It is not necessary that the US Navy abandons its contribution of maritime dominance, but it must learn to be more flexible. The Navy should continue to equip to remain the dominant blue-water navy, but must educate its officer corps and non-commissioned officers to employ existing capabilities in an irregular way as well as harness partnerships with other nations. This will require an understanding of counterinsurgency concepts as well as the traditional Navy skill sets.

Build a network to fight the network. This requires both analysis of the terrorist network and a shift in Navy command and control paradigms. First, the Navy must identify critical hubs in the terrorist structure from a maritime perspective, and propose predictions as to which hubs will become critical hubs once those first identified are disrupted. Second, the Navy must build a coalition network that mirrors the terrorist network. Completely hierarchical command and control structures will have to be replaced with a confederation of US and partner nation capabilities facilitated by human and communications infrastructure.

Employ a JIATF-like construct for MDA, MSO, and MIO. As the Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center (MHQ/MOC) concept matures, each fleet should add a JIATF-like

command element, tailored to the region, to focus on MDA for transnational threats. These JIATF-like elements would include liaisons with other JTFs, and country teams, and would focus on fusing intelligence across the sea-to-land interface. Manpower could be challenging, but fleet staffs already have intelligence officers and analysts as well as operational planners who focus on counterterrorism and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO). They could be dedicated to the JIATFs. There would be manpower costs, but there are other serendipitous solutions.

These JIATFs would have to be comfortable and effective at coordination and cooperation more than command and control. The JIATF commander would have to work with other JTFs, liaisons, country teams, and partner nation security forces to fuse intelligence, coordinate detection and monitoring assets, facilitate interdiction and handoff to law enforcement agencies. Some of these cooperative relationships already exist, but the JIATFs would institutionalize them.

Transform the Navy Sections into local task force commanders. As discussed in the Joint Operations Concept for Irregular Warfare, the Navy Sections, like the Military Groups, should be expanded to serve Title 10 as well as Title 22 functions. Traditionally the NCCs are responsible for battlespace seaward of the high watermark. This has traditionally created a disruptive operational and informational seam.⁴⁸ The NCCs must bridge the sea-to-land interface through a network of Navy Sections who act as local task force commanders and synchronize the efforts of partner nation forces with those of the NCCs operating outside the respected twelve nautical limits.

Share intelligence prolifically and openly with partners. For the Navy Section Chiefs to fulfill this task they will require streamlined protocols for intelligence sharing. NCC intelligence staffs will need liaison with each critical Navy Section facilitating a distributing intelligence-sharing

network. The Navy Sections will synergize maritime efforts with other interagency efforts in the country. When entrusted with US intelligence (not sources) partners will participate fully. Establishing the relationships and infrastructure to facilitate sharing US intelligence with partners will provide the backbone for access to partner-nation intelligence. When the information is networked, the operations will be.

Build the right capability and capacity in partner nations in order to shore up maritime borders of weak coastal states. The US Navy is unquestionably working hard to develop partnerships in every region, but that effort, if not solely, primarily takes the form of fleet bilateral exercises. Should the US Navy sacrifice these? No, but these exercises contribute little toward helping priority countries secure their own waters. The Navy must develop comprehensive capability-and-capacity-building plans to establish forces to partner with where they are most needed. A 1,000 ship navy is good, but in some regions what is required is a 1,000 cutter coast guard.

Many capability-and-capacity-building efforts include only tactical level effort and are usually conducted through too infrequent visits by rotational training teams. A good deal of military-to-military (or military-to-security-force) training is considered the province of Special Operations Forces. Special Operations Forces are by their very nature a limited resource, and therefore have to be employed judiciously. They cannot train large numbers of conventional forces, and are in fact best used to build special or advanced capability inside partner nation forces. Though the Navy will undoubtedly require cooperation from United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and rely on SOCOM forces in effectively waging its global maritime security campaign, it is the Navy that has the lead for global maritime security.

Teams must be tailor-made for each effort with components at the partner nation's national, operational and tactical levels. The goal will not be to build blue-water navies, but maritime law enforcement agencies that will enforce their nation's laws while passing information to, and receiving information from coalition navies, and synchronizing their efforts with other law enforcement agencies in their countries. The Navy will require support from the US Coast Guard and SOCOM. Navy officers will lead the effort, but will require experts in maritime law enforcement, intelligence, to name a few.

"Persistence" will need to be the watchword. Anyone who makes physical fitness an important part of life understands the importance of persistence. Going to the gym once a week yields unimpressive results. Daily efforts to build and maintain strength, endurance, and flexibility achieve optimal returns. Likewise, nascent efforts will require semi-permanent teams, perhaps on one-year rotations, to develop initial capability. As these teams achieve success in training the trainer, they will be able to reduce their presence. Once the partner nation's capability is full established, then, and only then, will teams be able to visit periodically to maintain and sharpen capability.

CONCLUSION

Transnational terrorists, as with other transnational actors like drug traffickers, conduct business on the oceans in relative anonymity. The US Navy has a leading role in denying transnational criminals in general, and terrorists especially, use of the maritime domain. The Navy's experience as part of a broader interagency effort in the War on Drugs is full of applicable lessons.

Over forty years, the interagency learned that maritime interdiction efforts are effective if cued by all-source, fused intelligence and done in cooperation with multinational partners.

Partners may need help from the United States in meeting their obligations, but that help is well worth it as those partner nations preside over their territorial waters, a critical seam between international and nation efforts to counter transnational threats. This network of multinational and interagency partners is even more powerful when emboldened by strong information-sharing protocols, and synergized at the operational level by an organization like a JIATF.

The Navy stands ready to implement these lessons. It can and should remain the preeminent navy in the world. It can also organize and educate itself to counter transnational threats. The Navy will not have done this job right until it has become a leader of the interagency effort needed to detect, monitor, and deny terrorism related use of the seas. The Navy must act fast. The United States does not have time to learn these lessons again, forty years is too long to leave the terrorists unchallenged in the maritime domain while the prepare for another catastrophic attack on the homeland.

Notes

- ¹ U.S. Navy, *Naval Transformation Roadmap*, 2003.
- ² Donal C. Winter, "Navy Transformation: A Stable, Long-Term View", *Heritage Foundation*, Number 1004, 7 February 2007.
- ³ *National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness*, 1.
- ⁴ Sam J. Tangredi, "Globalization and Sea Power: Overview and Context," in *Globalization and Maritime Power*, ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), 4.
- ⁵ Michael D. Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko, David S. Ortiz, *Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), xxii.
- ⁶ *National Military Strategic Plan for the Global War on Terrorism*, 4.
- ⁷ Max B. Manwaring, *U.S. Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Why Colombia, Why Now, and What is to be Done?* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2001), 6-8.
- ⁸ Manwaring, *Why Colombia?*, 17.
- ⁹ The White House, *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, 2005 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005), 5-6.
- ¹⁰ Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, Jonathan Cave, *Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1988), 47.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹² *Ibid.*, 47-50.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 51-52.
- ¹⁴ Alexander Monroe, *Caribbean Barrier: U.S. Atlantic Command Support of Counterdrug Operations 1989-1997*, (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2000), 15-16.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 14, 17.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 34.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 27-28.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 16, 22.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 27, 56-58.
- ²² Monthly Coast Guard Drug Seizure Statistics. <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/Drugs/Statswww.htm>.
- ²³ Reuter, *Sealing the Borders*, 47.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²⁶ Monroe, *Caribbean Barrier*. 17-19.
- ²⁷ Peter Zirnite, *Reluctant Recruits: The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs*, (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 1997), 19-21.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 17.
- ²⁹ Dario E. Teicher, *The Decisive Phase of Colombia's War on Narco-Terrorism* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 2005), 18-19.
- ³⁰ U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Staff, *Plan Colombia: Elements for Success*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2006), 1-2.

³¹ Teicher, *The Decisive Phase*, 7.

³² Ibid., 18-19.

³³ Manwaring, *Why Colombia*, 14.

³⁴ Richard M. Yeatman, "JIATF-South: Blueprint for Success", *Joint Force Quarterly*, July, 2006.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Yeatman, "JIATF-South".

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ SFRC, *Plan Colombia*, 3, 6.

⁴⁰ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Plan Colombia*, 3, 4, 8-9.

⁴¹ Margaret Daly Hayes, Richard D. Kohout, Patrick H. Roth, Gary F. Wheatley, *Future Naval Cooperation With Latin America: Program Descriptions and Assessment*, (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 1995), 161.

⁴² Ibid., 174-178.

⁴³ SFRC, *Plan Colombia*, 7-8.

⁴⁴ Frank G. Hoffman, "Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution and Military Affairs," *Orbis*, Summer 2006.

⁴⁵ Congressional Research Service, *Navy Role in Global War on Terrorism*, 2007 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 1-5

⁴⁶ Frank W. Lacroix, Irving N. Blickstein, *Forks in the Road for the U.S. Navy*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), vii.

⁴⁷ Lacroix, *Forks in the Road*, 34-45.

⁴⁸ *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, US Department of Defense, 2007.

APPENDIX A

CURRENT US NAVY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

A Congressional Research Service report published in April of 2007 lists the following as long-standing roles for the US Navy in the Global War on Terrorism:

- medical and construction support for ground forces in Iraq;
- surveillance by Navy ships and aircraft of suspected terrorists overseas;
- maritime interception operations (MIO) aimed at identifying and intercepting terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea;
- Naval Special Warfare operations;
- Tomahawk cruise missile attacks;
- Maritime Domain Awareness program;
- assisting the U.S. Coast Guard in port-security operations;
- protection of forward-deployed Navy ships, bases and facilities.

The report also lists a number of initiatives as efforts to expand the Navy's role in the Global War on Terrorism:

- establishing a "1,000 ship Navy", a multilateral maritime partnership for ensuring global maritime security;
- establishing Global Fleet Stations;
- establishing the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC);
- reestablishing the Navy's riverine force;

- establishing a reserve civil affairs battalion, a MIO intelligence exploitation pilot program, an intelligence data-mining capability, a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community;
- assuming command of a GWOT-related joint task force in the Horn of Africa, the detainee operation at Guantanamo, Cuba, and Fort Suse, a high-security prison in Iraq, and assuming the lead in defending the Haditha Dam in Iraq;
- developing a GWOT mission module for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS);

engaging with the U.S. Coast Guard to use the National Strategy for Maritime Security to more rapidly develop capabilities for Homeland Security, particularly in the area of MDA.ⁱ

ⁱ Congressional Research Service, *Navy Role in Global War on Terrorism*, 2007 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 1-5

APPENDIX B

TRANSFORMATION FORKS IN THE ROAD

- Global Maritime Tracking and Homeland Defense
- Recognize the Navy's Joint Role
- Transitioning the Aircraft Carrier to a Joint Aviation Platform
- Modularity
- Sea Basing
- Follow-on to Trident
- Organizational Relocation Based on Information Technology (IT) Modernization
- Cost-Effective Electronic and Laser Weapons
- Increase Navy Role in the Development of the Small-Diameter Bomb
- Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs), Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs)—Roles,
Missions, Functions, Concept of Operations

Transposing Navy's Presence Function to Space (Implications of the Militarization of Space)ⁱ

ⁱ Frank W. Lacroix, Irving N. Blickstein, *Forks in the Road for the U.S. Navy*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), x-xi.

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